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THE PROBLEM OF ARTIFICIAL PRECISION IN THEORIES OF
VAGUENESS: A NOTE ON THE ROˆLE OF MAXIMAL
CONSISTENCY
VINCENZO MARRA
Abstract. The problem of artiﬁcial precision is a major objection to any
theory of vagueness based on real numbers as degrees of truth. Suppose you are
willing to admit that, under suﬃciently speciﬁed circumstances, a predication
of “is red” receives a unique, exact number from the real unit interval [0, 1].
You should then be committed to explain what is it that determines that
value, settling for instance that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than
0.321. In this note I revisit the problem in the important case of  Lukasiewicz
inﬁnite-valued propositional logic that brings to the foreground the roˆle of
maximally consistent theories. I argue that the problem of artiﬁcial precision,
as commonly conceived of in the literature, actually conﬂates two distinct
problems of a very diﬀerent nature.
1
The monadic predicate P (x) :=“x is prime”, interpreted over the set of natural
numbers x > 1, is (absolutely) precise: its extension is the set of prime numbers;
its anti-extension is the set of composite numbers; each number either belongs to
the extension of P or to its anti-extension, but not to both; and in principle there is
no issue as to whether a given number be prime or composite — though in practice
it may be impossible to ascertain which is the case for an astronomic instance of
x. By contrast, the monadic predicate R(x) :=“x is red”, interpreted over the set
of all objects, is (to some extent) vague: its extension ought to be the set of all
red objects; its anti-extension ought to be the set of all non-red objects; but it may
not be clear, even in principle, just which objects do qualify as red, and which as
non-red — think of a peculiar tint at the borderline between red and pink.
Is there a logic of vague predicates — or, for that matter, of vague propositions?
Any deﬁnite answer, at present, is likely to be contentious. The philosophical
literature on vagueness is relatively large; accounts of the main competing theories
may be found in [Wil96, Kee00, Sha06, Smi08]. One cluster of theories is based
on the assumption that any instantiation of a vague predicate R by a constant c
whose denotatum lies, intuitively, at the borderline between the extension of R and
its complement, is only true to a degree. Thus if c denotes my coat, and my coat is
of a peculiar tint at the borderline between red and pink, on theories of this sort the
proposition R(c) :=“My coat is red” is to be considered neither true nor false, but
rather true to some intermediate degree. In this line of thought, a much stronger
and yet popular assumption is that the real unit interval [0, 1] embodies “degrees
of truth”. See [Wil96, Chapter 4] for an account of many-valued approaches to
vagueness; [Smi08] is a recent proposal of a theory of vagueness based on degrees
of truth modelled by [0, 1].
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Arguably, any such [0, 1]-valued theory of vagueness faces the problem of artiﬁcial
precision.1 Perhaps the ﬁrst passage were the locution ‘artiﬁcial precision’ was used
in this connection is in [Haa79, p. 443]:
[Fuzzy logic] imposes artiﬁcial precision [. . .While] one is not obliged
to require that a predicate either deﬁnitely applies or deﬁnitely does
not apply, one is obliged to require that a predicate deﬁnitely ap-
plies to such-and-such, rather than to such-and-such other, degree
(e.g. that a man 5ft 10in tall belongs to tall to degree 0.6 rather
than 0.5).
Tye [Tye89, p. 14] makes a similar point:
One serious objection to [the many-valued approach] is that it really
replaces vagueness with the most incredible and reﬁned precision.
In these terms, the objection is rather generic. It is not clear that a precise semantics
for vague concepts is, per se, a contradictory prospect. A sharper form of the
objection, however, was put forth by Keefe [Kee00, p. 47], who identiﬁes the source
of the problem in our failure to see what could determine the correct value uniquely:
[T]he degree theorist’s assignments impose precision in a form that
is just as unacceptable as a classical true/false assignment. [. . . ]
All predications of “is red” will receive a unique, exact value, but
it seems inappropriate to associate our vague predicate “red” with
any particular exact function from objects to degrees of truth. For
a start, what could determine which is the correct function, settling
that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321?
Smith [Smi08, p. 279] endorses the objection in this form:
Intuitively, it is not correct to say that there is one unique element
of [0, 1] that correctly represents the degree of truth of ‘Bob is bald’,
with all other choices being incorrect. [. . . ] we have an aﬀront to
intuition [because] [w]e cannot see what could possibly determine
that the degree of truth of ‘Bob is bald’ is 0.61 rather than 0.62 or
0.6 [...]
There is no question, I think, that the problem of artiﬁcial precision construed
in this manner is a genuine objection to [0, 1]-valued theories of vagueness; no such
theory can get away without a plausible response to it. The purpose of this note is
not to provide such a response. Rather more modestly, my aim is merely to point
out that the problem of artiﬁcial precision actually conﬂates two distinct issues of
a very diﬀerent nature: one falls within the realm of mathematical logic proper;
the other belongs to enquiries into the semantics of vagueness. It seems to me that
being clear about this distinction is an important preliminary to any treatment of
the problem of artiﬁcial precision.
2
The problem of artiﬁcial precision is only concerned with propositions, because
only propositions can receive a truth value. In order to focus on the essence of
the objection, I will therefore restrict attention to propositional logic throughout
1The related but distinct problem of higher-order vagueness (see e.g. [Kee00, pp. 31–36]) will
not be considered in this note.
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the paper. However, even once it be agreed that truth values range in [0, 1], there
remains much leeway to develop a formal system of many-valued propositional logic.
The technical details of some of my arguments will depend on the speciﬁcs of the
formal system under consideration; it is therefore important to be clear about the
[0, 1]-valued logic in question. I propose to concentrate on  Lukasiewicz (inﬁnite-
valued propositional) logic. This is a non-classical system going back to the 1920’s,
cf. the early survey [ LT30, §3], and its annotated English translation in [Tar56, pp.
38–59]. The standard modern reference for  Lukasiewicz logic is [CDM00], while
[Mun11] deals with topics at the frontier of current research.  Lukasiewicz logic can
also be regarded as a member of a larger hierarchy of many-valued logics that was
systematised by Petr Ha´jek in the late Nineties, cf. [Ha´j98]. Here I recall the basic
notions.
Let us ﬁx once and for all the countably inﬁnite set of propositional variables:
Var = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn, . . .} .
Let us write ⊥ for the logical constant falsum, ¬ for the unary negation connective,
and → for the binary implication connective. (Further derived connectives are
introduced below.) The set Form of (well-formed) formulæ2 is deﬁned exactly as
in classical logic over the language {⊥,¬,→}.
The  Lukasiewicz calculus is deﬁned by the ﬁve3 axiom schemata
(A0) ⊥ → α (Ex falso quodlibet.)
(A1) α→ (β → α) (A fortiori.)
(A2) (α→ β)→ ((β → γ)→ (α→ γ)) (Implication is transitive.)
(A3) ((α→ β)→ β)→ ((β → α)→ α) (Disjunction is commutative.)
(A4) (¬α→ ¬β)→ (β → α) (Contraposition.)
with modus ponens as the only deduction rule. Provability is deﬁned exactly as
in classical logic; ⊢ α means that formula α is provable. I write L to denote
 Lukasiewicz logic.
The logical constant verum (⊤), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), and the bicon-
ditional (↔) are deﬁned as in Table 1. From the deﬁnition of disjunction one sees
that (A3) indeed asserts the commutativity of disjunction. Other common derived
connectives are reported in the same table, with their deﬁnition. Some remarks are
in order. Using the biconditional, one deﬁnes formulæ α, β ∈ Form to be logically
equivalent just in case ⊢ α ↔ β holds. The connectives ⊙ and ⊕ are then De
Morgan dual: α ⊕ β is logically equivalent to ¬(¬α ⊙ ¬β), and α ⊙ β is logically
equivalent to ¬(¬α⊕¬β). These connectives, known as the strong disjunction (⊕)
and strong conjunction (⊙) of L , play a central roˆle both in Ha´jek’s treatment of
many-valued logics [Ha´j98], and in Chang’s algebraisation of L via MV-algebras
[CDM00]. They are not idempotent, in the sense that α⊕α and α are not logically
equivalent: only the implication α → α⊕ α is provable; dual considerations apply
to ⊙. Conjunction (∧) and disjunction (∨) also are De Morgan dual, but they
2A set of conventions for omitting parentheses in formulæ is usually adopted (⊥ is more binding
than ¬, and ¬ is more binding than →), and later extended to derived connectives. I do not spell
the details here, as the conventions are analogous to the ones in classical logic, and are unlikely
to cause confusion.
3In [CDM00, Chapter 4] the language has no logical constants, and consequently (A0) does
not appear as an axiom. I prefer to explicitly have ⊥ in the language, and thus I add Ex falso
quodlibet to the standard axiomatisation.
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Notation Definition Name Idempotent
⊥ – Falsum –
⊤ ¬⊥ Verum –
¬α – Negation –
α→ β – Implication –
α ∨ β (α→ β)→ β (Lattice) Disjunction Yes
α ∧ β ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) (Lattice) Conjunction Yes
α↔ β (α→ β) ∧ (β → α) Biconditional –
α⊕ β ¬α→ β Strong disjunction No
α⊙ β ¬(α→ ¬β) Strong conjunction No
α⊖ β ¬(α→ β) But not, or Diﬀerence –
Table 1. Connectives in  Lukasiewicz logic.
are idempotent; in fact, they are sometimes called the lattice connectives because
they induce the structure of a distributive lattice in the algebraic semantics of L .
Finally, the connective ⊖ is the co-implication, i.e. the dual to →.
If S ⊆ Form is any set of formulæ, one writes S ⊢ α to mean that α is provable
in  Lukasiewicz logic, under the additional set of assumptions S. When this is the
case, one says that α is a syntactic consequence of S. Since each one of (A0–A4) is a
principle of classical reasoning, and since modus ponens is a classically valid rule of
inference, each formula provable in L is a theorem of classical propositional logic.
The converse is not true: most notably, the tertium non datur law, α ∨ ¬α, is not
provable in  Lukasiewicz logic; this is one simple consequence of the completeness
theorem to be recalled shortly. In fact, it can be shown that the addition of α∨¬α
as a sixth axiom schema to (A0–A4) yields classical logic.
By a theory in  Lukasiewicz logic one means any set of formulæ that is closed
under provability, i.e. is deductively closed. For any S ⊆ Form, the smallest theory
that extends S exists: it is the deductive closure S⊢ of S, deﬁned by α ∈ S⊢ if, and
only if, S ⊢ α. A theory Θ is consistent if Θ 6= Form, and inconsistent otherwise;
and it is maximal, or maximally consistent, if it is consistent, and whenever α ∈
Form is such that α 6∈ Θ, then (Θ ∪ {α})⊢ = Form, i.e. Θ ∪ {α} is inconsistent.
A theory Θ is axiomatised by a set S ⊆ Form of formulæ if it so happens that
Θ = S⊢; and Θ is ﬁnitely axiomatisable if S can be chosen ﬁnite.
Let us now turn to the [0, 1]-valued semantics. An atomic assignment, or atomic
evaluation, is an arbitrary function w : Var → [0, 1]. Such an atomic evaluation
is uniquely extended to an evaluation of all formulæ, or possible world, i.e. to a
function w : Form→ [0, 1], via the compositional rules:
w(⊥) = 0 ,
w(α → β) = min {1, 1− (w(α) − w(β))} ,
w(¬α) = 1− w(α) .
It follows by trivial computations that the formal semantics of derived connectives is
the one reported in Table 2. Tautologies are deﬁned as those formulæ that evaluate
to 1 under every evaluation. Let us write  α to mean that the formula α ∈ Form
is a tautology. The relativisation of this concept to theories leads to the notion
of semantic consequence. Let S ⊆ Form be any subset, and let Θ = S⊢ be its
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Notation Formal semantics
⊥ w(⊥) = 0
⊤ w(⊤) = 1
¬α w(¬α) = 1− w(α)
α→ β w(α→ β) = min {1, 1− (w(α) − w(β))}
α ∨ β w(α ∨ β) = max {w(α), w(β)}
α ∧ β w(α ∧ β) = min {w(α), w(β)}
α↔ β w(α↔ β) = 1− |w(α) − w(β)|
α⊕ β w(α ⊕ β) = min {1, w(α) + w(β)}
α⊙ β w(α⊙ β) = max {0, w(α) + w(β) − 1}
α⊖ β w(α ⊖ β) = max {0, w(α)− w(β)}
Table 2. Formal semantics of connectives in  Lukasiewicz logic.
associated theory. Given α ∈ Form, the assertion S  α states that any evaluation
w : Form → [0, 1] that satisﬁes w(S) = {1} — meaning that w(β) = 1 for each
β ∈ S — must also satisfy w(α) = 1. When this is the case, we say that α is a
semantic consequence of S. We write S for the set of semantic consequences of S.
It is an exercise to check that L enjoys the generalised validity theorem: for
any S ⊆ Form and any α ∈ Form, if S ⊢ α then S |= α. On the other hand,
it is a non-trivial theorem that L is complete4 with respect to the many-valued
semantics above: hence ⊢ α if, and only if, |= α, for any α ∈ Form. The ﬁrst proof
of this appeared in [RR58]; see also [CDM00, 4.5.1 & 4.5.2].
All of the above can be adapted in the obvious manner to the ﬁnite set Varn =
{X1, . . . , Xn}, in which case one speaks of  Lukasiewicz logic over n (propositional)
variables, denoted Ln. Although, strictly speaking, one should introduce fresh
consequence relation symbols ⊢n and n for each Ln, I will avoid this pedantry
and use ⊢ and  in all cases; context will do the rest. I will write Formn for the
set of formulæ whose propositional variables are contained in Varn. We will be
mostly concerned with the apparently trivial case of L1.
3
What is the logical status of an assumption such as “ ‘VM is tall’5 is true to
degree r ∈ [0, 1] ”? Let us begin with the remark of an eminent logician [H0´9, p.
368].
[Regarding the problem of artiﬁcial precision,] [l]et us comment
that mathematical fuzzy logic concerns the possibility of sound in-
ference, surely not techniques of ascribing concrete truth degrees
to concrete propositions.
4However, L fails strong completeness (i.e. completeness for theories): there is a set S ⊆ Form
and a formula α ∈ Form such that S |= α, but S 6⊢ α; see [CDM00, 4.6].
5Not all vague predicates are alike. The predicate Tall (·) comes in pair with its opposite,
Short (·), over the domain of all individuals, say; but Red (·) does not: there is no colour term for
non-Red (·) in the visible spectrum. Although I will not argue the point in this note, I believe
that L cannot be an appropriate formal model of vague predicates such as Red (·). Hence the
shift from redness to tallness.
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The point Ha´jek is making here is by no means limited to mathematical fuzzy logic.
Logic is exclusively concerned with the form of an argument, not with its content.
Logic can teach us nothing (factual).
Thus the assumption “ ‘VM is tall’ is true to degree r ” has extra-logical content.
In particular, it is a semantic assumption: it tells us that certain states of aﬀairs
(namely, those wherein “VM is tall” is true to a degree 6= r), while perhaps logically
consistent, are known (or assumed) not to be the case. In fact, it is reasonable
to expect that the assumption “ ‘VM is tall’ is true to degree r ” be maximally
strong, falling short only of the strongest, inconsistent assumption according to
which everything is the case. For the stronger an assumption is, the fewer models
it has, i.e. the fewer are the possible worlds that are consistent with it. Now
the assumption “ ‘VM is tall’ is true to degree r ” leaves us with just one6 possible
world consistent with it, namely, the one world in which VM is tall to degree exactly
r. This solitary possible world is the bare minimum we need to stay clear of the
precipice of inconsistency.
We can considerably sharpen these initial remarks. Let us focus on the vague
proposition
X1 := “VM is tall” , (*)
formally modelled by the propositional variable X1 in L1. There are two distinct
situations.
(S1) All we know about X1 is that it is a propositional variable.
(S2) All we know about X1 is that it is a propositional variable such that the
possible worlds w : Form→ [0, 1] that we are ready to admit in light of the
intended interpretation (*) of X1 are precisely those satisfying w(X1) = r,
for a ﬁxed real number r ∈ [0, 1].
Failure to distinguish between (S1) and (S2) amounts to ignoring a set of extra-
logical assumptions, namely, those encoded by (*). Suppose ﬁrst we are in situation
(S1). Consider any formula α(X1) ∈ Form1. Then, in our intended interpretation,
α(X1) is a statement about VM’s tallness. But, given (S1), such a statement can
be truthfully asserted if, and only if, it is a provable formula: ⊢ α(X1). In other
words, such statements coincide with analytic truths (relative to L1) which, by
their very nature, are absolutely uninformative about whoever’s tallness. Given
(S1) only, whatever statement one can truthfully assert about VM’s tallness, one
can equally truthfully assert about TW’s thinness, and conversely. In situation (S1)
the problem of artiﬁcial precision does not even make sense: there is no speciﬁc
truth value to be puzzled about.7
By contrast, it is in situation (S2) that the problem of artiﬁcial precision arises.
Now we are only concerned with evaluations w : Form→ [0, 1] that satisfy w(X1) =
r. Let us call such evaluations admissible8 for our intended interpretation (*) of
X1. Consider any formula α(X1) ∈ Form1. Then, on our intended interpretation,
6Assuming that all propositions under consideration are built from the single atomic one “VM
is tall”, and that the logic is truth-functional. Since, formally, the discussion applies to L1, these
assumptions are satisﬁed.
7Compare Haack’s claim that “[In fuzzy logic] one is obliged to require that a predicate deﬁ-
nitely applies to such-and-such, rather than to such-and-such other, degree” [Haa79, loc. cit.]. It
was just shown that the claim, if taken at face value, is unwarranted.
8There is just one such admissible evaluation in L1, of course. I am using the plural form in
preparation for the forthcoming extension (ST ).
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α(X1) is a statement about VM’s tallness. But, given (S2), it is no longer the
case that α(X1) can be truthfully asserted if, and only if, ⊢ α(X1). On the one
hand, if ⊢ α(X1), then certainly any admissible w satisﬁes w(α(X1)) = 1 by the
validity theorem, so that α(X1) is indeed true on our intended interpretation (*)
— but again, such analytic truths have nothing to do with my tallness. On the
other hand, however, there will be formulæ α(X1) that are not provable in L1,
but are such that α(X1) can be truthfully asserted under (S2), precisely because
we restrict attention to admissible evaluations only. For a trivial example, assume
r = 1: then the formula X1 can be truthfully asserted subject to (S2), simply
because we restrict attention to the one possible world where X1 indeed holds. In
general, let Θr ⊆ Form1 be the collection of all those formulæ over the variable
X1 that may be truthfully asserted given (S2), that is, set
Θr = {α(X1) ∈ Form1 | w(α(X1)) = 1 whenever w(X1) = r} , (†)
where w : Form1 → [0, 1] ranges over all possible worlds. Then those formulæ in Θr
that are not analytic truths are precisely the synthetic, factual truths about VM’s
tallness that the semantic assumption w(X1) = r entails, and that L1 is able to
express syntactically. In other words, the set of formulæ Θr attempts to encode
the semantic assumption (S2) at the syntactic level, to within the formal linguistic
resources aﬀorded by L1.
There are intermediate situations, of course.
(ST ) All we know about X1 is that it is a propositional variable such that the
possible worlds w : Form→ [0, 1] that we are ready to admit in light of the
intended interpretation (*) of X1 are precisely those satisfying w(X1) ∈ T ,
for a ﬁxed subset T ⊆ [0, 1].
If T = [0, 1], then (ST ) is (S1): we are imposing no restriction on possible worlds.
If T = {r}, then (ST ) is (S2): the only possible world we are ready to admit is
the one with w(X1) = r. We can adapt (†) to the intermediate situations in the
obvious manner:
ΘT = {α(X1) ∈ Form1 | w(α(X1)) = 1 whenever w(X1) ∈ T } , (‡)
where w : Form1 → [0, 1] ranges over all possible worlds.
It turns out that ΘT as in (‡) is a theory in L1 for any choice of T ⊆ [0, 1]:
the generalised validity theorem guarantees that the semantic assumption (ST ) is
reﬂected into a deductively closed set of syntactic assumptions (‡). It is also clear
by the very deﬁnition (‡) that ΘT is a superset of ΘT ′ whenever T ⊆ T
′, for any two
subsets T, T ′ ⊆ [0, 1]. Thus the (syntactic representation of the) assumption, say,
“ ‘VM is tall’ is true to degree> 1
2
” is no stronger than the (syntactic representation
of the) assumption “ ‘VM is tall’ is true to degree 2
3
”. Once more, this suggests that
a theory Θr, for r ∈ [0, 1], should correspond to a maximally strong assumption.
Let now M be the set of all theories in L1 that can be written in the form (†).
That is,
M = {Σ ⊆ Form1 | There exists r ∈ [0, 1] such that Σ = Θr} .
The next proposition9 conﬁrms the intuitions above about the members of M .
9As mentioned, Θr is deductively closed for any r ∈ [0, 1]. Given α ∈ Form1, suppose Θr ⊢ α.
If wr : Form1 → [0, 1] is the unique evaluation such that wr(X1) = r, then wr(Θr) = {1} by (†);
since Θr ⊢ α, then wr(α) = 1 by the generalised validity theorem for L1; hence α ∈ Θr, again by
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Proposition 1. M is precisely the collection of all maximally consistent theories
in L1.
This result leaves open the possibility that diﬀerent real numbers determine the
same maximally consistent theory via (†), which leads to a key question.
(Q1) Is the semantic assumption (S2) precisely equivalent to the set of syntactic
assumptions (†)? More precisely, is the correspondence
r ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ Θr ∈ M (⋆)
determined by deﬁnition (†) a bijection between the real unit interval [0, 1],
and the set M of maximally consistent theories in L1?
I note in passing that generalisations of this question make sense for arbitrary sets
of propositional variables10 (i.e. for Ln, n > 0 an integer, and for the whole of L ),
and, in another direction, for arbitrary subsets T ⊆ [0, 1] of truth values and their
associated theories11 as in (‡). However, for the purposes of this note it will be
enough to concentrate on (Q1).
Although the details will vary,12 close analogues of (Q1) can be asked for virtually
any [0, 1]-valued logic S , under rather weak assumptions. If the answer to (Q1)
is negative then there is a discrepancy between our formal, [0, 1]-valued semantics,
and the expressive power of such a logic S . For if Θr = Θs with r 6= s ∈ [0, 1],
then the logic S is not suﬃciently expressive to discern between r and s, so that
it is legitimate to ask for further support to the claim that real numbers are the
basis of a suitable formal semantics for S . Indeed, proving that (Q1) has negative
answer for a speciﬁc [0, 1]-valued logic is a way of making precise the assertion
that its [0, 1]-valued semantics is “redundant”. I do not wish to suggest that all
redundant formal semantics (in the present sense) is useless. What I am implying,
though, is that there is a sense in which a redundant semantics poses a challenge
to logicians: some justiﬁcation for redundancy ought to be given, lest one incurs
Occam’s razor.13
(†). Moreover, Θr is consistent: since wr(⊥) = 0 by the semantics of ⊥, we have ⊥ 6∈ Θr in light
of (†). It is harder to prove that Θr is maximally consistent, and that all maximally consistent
theories are of this form. However, this is a standard result (essentially [CDM00, 4.6.3 and 3.5.1]).
10In which case Proposition 1 and question (Q1) would be concerned with maximally consistent
theories in Ln or L .
11In which case Proposition 1 and question (Q1) would be concerned with semisimple theories,
i.e. those theories for which completeness holds; see [CDM00, 4.6 and 3.6].
12The main issue in generalizing (Q1) to other systems is that Proposition 1 most often fails,
so that it is not enough to consider maximally consistent theories only. For example, in the
important Go¨del-Dummett logic [Ha´j98, Chapter 4], M turns out to be exactly the collection of
all prime theories in the one-variable fragment, where a theory Θ is prime if it proves either α → β
or β → α for any two formulæ α and β.
13If S is such that (Q1) has negative answer, then the formal semantics of S violates Leibniz’s
Identity of Indiscernibles: in deference to which, we ought to identify real numbers (=possible
worlds) r, s ∈ [0, 1] whenever they satisfy Θr = Θs, provided all we are concerned with are those
properties of r and s that are expressible within S . If we insist not to identify r and s, then there
must be distinguishing properties of these two possible worlds, not expressible with the linguistic
resources of S , that we nonetheless wish our formal semantics to record. A formal semantics
strictly richer than the available language is of course a perfectly reasonable construct, but it had
better result from an explicit choice — not from overlooking a negative answer to (Q1). I do not
elaborate this line of thought further in this note.
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Such worries need not concern us insofar as we are dealing with  Lukasiewicz
logic:
Proposition 2. The answer to (Q1) is aﬃrmative. That is, (⋆) is a bijection
between [0, 1] and maximally consistent theories in L1.
This fact14 rests on Otto Ho¨lder’s theorem from 1901 that a totally ordered Archi-
medean group embeds into the real numbers. The mathematical details involved
should not blind us to the remarkable conceptual content of Proposition 2: the
innocent-looking axioms (A0–A4) of  Lukasiewicz logic characterise the real num-
bers, in the sense that maximally consistent theories in L1 classify the elements of
[0, 1].
4
What does all this have to do with vagueness? Nothing: (Q1) does not mention
vagueness at all. Mutatis mutandis, (Q1) is a question that can be asked about
virtually any logic with a [0, 1]-valued semantics, and the answer will be indepen-
dent of any intended interpretation of that logic; brieﬂy, (Q1) is a question in
mathematical logic.
But, having isolated (Q1) as worthy of attention, we can proceed to ask a second
key question.
(Q2) Given r ∈ [0, 1], can we read oﬀ Θr as in (†) the synthetic truths about
X1 determined by (S2) in a form that is intelligible with respect to our
intended interpretation (*)?
Vagueness — the intended interpretation — enters the picture at this stage: for
(Q2) makes no sense in terms of the formal semantics alone. We are given the truth
value r ∈ [0, 1], and the corresponding maximally consistent theory Θr induced in
L1 by (†). We must provide, if we can, an interpretation of the formulæ in Θr as
assertions of vague propositions about VM’s tallness, that taken together amount
to an explanation of what it means for VM to be tall to degree r. The answer
to (Q2) is aﬃrmative insofar as this interpretation and the ensuing explanation
are convincing. In case Θr is ﬁnitely (hence singly) axiomatisable, and one such
axiomatisation is known,15 we are thus concerned with a single formula α(X1) such
that Θr = {α(X1)}
⊢. We must provide a reading of α(X1), as a single assertion
about VM’s tallness, that convincingly explains what it means to assume “ ‘VM is
tall’ is true to degree r ”. Observe that this explanation, whatever it is, need not
(should not) mention r itself — nor, for that matter, any other number. This is
because α(X1) is a formula in L1, and this logic has no truth constants other than
verum and falsum.
14Algebraically, Proposition 2 amounts to the representation theorem for 1-generated semisim-
ple MV-algebras, see [CDM00, Chapter 3]. Via Mundici’s categorical equivalence between MV-
algebras and lattice-ordered Abelian groups with a strong order unit [CDM00, 7.1], this is equiv-
alent to Ho¨lder’s theorem, for which the interested reader may consult [BKW77, §2.6].
15It can be proved that, given r ∈ [0, 1], Θr as in (†) is ﬁnitely axiomatisable in L1 if, and
only if, r is rational. Moreover, it is possible to exhibit an algorithm (for deﬁniteness, a Turing
machine) that, on input any rational number r ∈ [0, 1], outputs a formula αr(X1) satisfying
Θr = {αr(X1)}⊢. Everything hinges on the theory of continued fractions and Schauder hats; see
[CDM00, Chapter 3].
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I suggest here that (Q2) is a sharper formulation of the problem of artiﬁcial
precision, as stated at the beginning of this note, for  Lukasiewicz logic — and in
fact, the speciﬁcs aside, for any aspiring [0, 1]-valued logic of vagueness.
5
So what is the answer to (Q2) for  Lukasiewicz logic? New research16 is needed,
I think, to say something defensible in this connection. Perhaps a glimpse of the
diﬃculties involved may be caught if, by way of an epilogue to this note, we work
our way up to the modestly non-classical truth value 1
2
.
The theory Θ1 is axiomatised by the single formula X1. In symbols,
Θ1 = {X1}
⊢ .
In this case, the answer to (Q2) is that Your17 assumption “ ‘VM is tall’ is true
to degree 1 ” amounts to the fact that You are ready to assert that VM is clearly,
indisputably tall.
Similarly, Θ0 is axiomatised by the single formula ¬X1:
Θ0 = {¬X1}
⊢ .
The answer to (Q2) is clear in this case, too. The assumption “ ‘VM is tall’ is true
to degree 0 ” amounts to the fact that You are ready to assert that VM is clearly,
indisputably non-tall: in short, short.18
What about Θ 1
2
? We have
Θ 1
2
= { (¬X1 → X1) ∧ (X1 → ¬X1) }
⊢
.
Can we make sense of this? Quite generally (cf. Table 2), to assert α ∧ β in L
is to assert α and to assert β; and to assert α → β is to assert that α is (clearly,
indisputably) less true19 than β, or at the very most just as true.
So Your assumption that “ ‘VM is tall’ is true to degree 1
2
” amounts to the fact
that You are ready to assert both that VM is clearly, indisputably less of a case of
a short man, than he is a case of a tall man, and that VM is clearly, indisputably
less of a case of a tall man, than he is a case of a short man.
16Since [Mac76],  Lukasiewicz logic has been widely discussed in the philosophical literature as a
candidate for a logic of vagueness. More often than not, it has been rejected; cf. e.g. [Wil96, Kee00].
To the best of my knowledge, though, the quite speciﬁc question (Q2) has not been addressed.
17Compare Bruno de Finetti’s usage [dF90a, dF90b] of the capitalised second person singular
pronoun to stress that attributing a degree of probability to a (classical) proposition is a personal
matter.
18Cf. Footnote 5.
19Caution: no circularity is involved in this passage. The objection of artiﬁcial precision can
only be raised against theories that (i) have already committed to degrees of truth, and (ii) have
embraced [0, 1], or some other precisely speciﬁed structure, as a mathematical model for degrees
of truth and their relationships. The charge that we are here using a comparative notion of truth
to explain artiﬁcial precision, without justifying the assumption that truth does come in degrees,
has therefore no force. Similary, the problem of justifying why degrees of truth are modelled by
the real numbers rather than, say, the octonions, may well be a problem — there is no paucity of
objections to (i–ii) in the literature — but it is a diﬀerent one.
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